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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GORDON L. WEIGHT, I 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
- vs.-
HARRY B. MlLLgR, and HARRY B. 
~tiLLER, dba LORRAINE PRESS, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
' BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATt:RE OF T·HE CASE 
Case No. 
10037 
This is an action by Plaintiff Gordon L. Weight to 
rpeover on a promissory note in the amount of $1,200.00 
and exeeuted in his favor by Defendant Harry B. Miller 
on the 2nd day of January, 1960. 
Dl~POSITION IN ·THE LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, with Judge :Merrill C. Faux presiding, awarded 
judgment to Plaintiff in the amount of $1,200.00, $92.00 
interest, attorney's fees in the amount of $348.33 and 
$15.00 costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Harry B. }filler seeks reversal of the 
decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Gordon L. Weight 
~t.'~:'ks affirmance of the lower court's decision. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent shall hereinafter be referred to as Plain-
tiff and Appellant shall hereinafter be referred to as 
Defendant. 
Plaintiff ~pts Defendant's Statement of Facts 
except in certain particulars noted as follows. Plaintiff 
does not concede that Plaintiff initiated the conversation 
with respect to entering into an employment agreement. 
Plaintiff denies that Defendant was specifically relying 
upon the payment by Plaintif~ of the balance of $3,800.00 
in order to purchase ~ certain printing press. Plaintiff 
does not agree that Defendant often reminded him that 
the balance of $3,800.00 was due but states affirmatively 
that the Plaintiff did not specify any particular time 
within which t~e balance should be paid. (R-11) Plain-
tiff asserts that he did not state to the bookkeeper Ruth 
!larks on the 18th of January, 1960, that he was employed 
elsewhere at the time. (R-40) Plaintiff further asserts 
that he did not break appointments with customers 
and did not evidence a loss of interest in his work. 
Plaintiff further denies that Defendant ever offered 
to pay him stock of the corporation as payment of the 
promissory note. (R-21) 
On the 1st day of October, 1959, Plaintiff and 
Defendant entered into an Employn1ent Agreement. The 
tern1s are essentially as set forth in D·efendant's State-
ment of Facts. Prt:!viously the Plaintiff had paid to the 
Defendant $1,200.00 The Agreement contemplated a 
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promis~ory note r{'presenting the investment made by 
Plaintiff. One such note was initially prepared for 
signature but was not signed by the Defendant. (R-10, 
~~. 30) During December, 1959, the Defendant became 
dissastisfied with Plaintiff's performance, ( R-28), re-
minded him of such, discussed the matter with Mr. 
~tontgomery, Plaintiff's attorney at the time (R-98), 
und as a result of such dissatisfaction stated to Plaintiff 
that he would discontinue paying hitn a salary and 
in~t~'ad pay him a 10% commission of sales. R-28) 
;\:-; a result of such condition imposed Plaintiff became 
dissatisfied with the working relationship and the em-
ployment arrangement was mutually terminated. 
As a cumulation of such termination the Defendant 
t>xecuted a promissory note on January 2, 1960, repre-
senting the initial. amount invested by Plaintiff. (R-3, 
~~l. 73, and P-1). Since the money was invested in Sep-
t~:>mlwr, 1959, the note was dated as of September, 1959, 
in order to entitle Plaintiff to interest from that date. 
1 H-73). 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMING DECISION OF 
LOWER COURT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING 
THAT THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT WAS 
MUTUALLY TERMINATED AND THAT THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,200.00 
WAS EXECUTED SUBSEQUENT TO SUCH TERMI-
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NATION AND THEREFORE HAD NO RELATION-
SHIP WITH THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT. 
In considering the soundness of the trial courts' 
findings and jndgtnent this court Inay indulge in the 
presuntption that the judgrnent was valid and was based 
upon competent evidence. The evidence and all infer-
ences that fairly and reasonably may be drawn therefrom 
1nust he viewed in light most favorable to it. The burden 
here is upon the Defendant in affirmatively showing that 
the trial court was in error. The following authorities 
are cited in support of the foregoing propositions: 
Charlton v. Hackett, 11 U 2d 389, 360 P2d 176 (1961); 
Cheney v. Rucker, 14 U2d 205, 381 P2d 86 (1963). 
The trier of fact can best judge the credibility of the 
witness and the weight to be given the evidence for he 
can observe firsthand their demeanor, forthrightness 
and candor. Jones v. California Packing Corp., 121 U 
612, 244 P2d 640; Page v. Federal Security Insurance 
Co., 8 U2d 226, 332 P2d 666 ( 1958). 
The evidence substantiates the court's findings that 
the parties had tern1inated the employment relationship 
and that the note in question was executed after such 
termination and, therefore, had no relationship with the 
employment agreement. In support of such contention 
Plaintiff sub1nits the following points: 
( 1) The Defendant was dissatisfied with the per-
formance of the Plaintiff and especially so in December, 
1959. (R-72, 76). He felt so keen about the matter that 
the Defendant left Plaintiff notes or memos reminding 
him about the fact that he was not earning as much as 
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h(' was being paid. (R-27). 
(~) The Defendant contacted 1tir. Montgomery, 
Plnintifrs attorney at the time, and discussed the matter 
with him. On that occasion the Defendant stated that 
ht• was "afraid he was going to have to let him go." It 
is significant that the Defendant felt so keenly about the 
mattPr that he felt prompted to discuss the matter with 
Mr. Montgomery. (R-98). 
( 3) Between January 2, 1960, and January 18, 1960, 
the Defendant had no contact with the Plaintiff and did 
not call him in order to inquire as to the reason for the 
Plaintiff not working. Such action on Defendant's part 
was certainly consistant with the position that the 
Defendant considered the employment relationship 
terminated (R-85, 86). 
(4) In December, 1959, the Defendant imposed as a 
condition of future employment that the Plaintiff should 
be paid on a 10% commission basis instead of a regular 
salary. Such condition was at variance with the terms 
of the Employment Agreement. The commission basis. 
was to be retroactive to December 15th. The Defendant 
refused to pay the Plaintiff for the last two weeks in 
December. (R-27, 28). 
( 5) The Plaintiff too was dissatisfied with the em-
ployment relationship. Defendant had not allowed him 
to participate in management and it was not his under-
standing that he should remain pennanently as a sales-
man. (R-27, 28). 
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(6) On January 2, 1960, the Defendant at Plaintiff's 
request, executed the promissory note on a blank printed 
fonn secured frmn an office supply company. ( R-39, 
73, P-1. The note was initially dated January 2, 1960, 
but this date was crossed out and the date September 
1, 1959, was inserted. This was for the sole reason of 
entitling the Plaintiff to interest from the date of his 
initial investment. (~73). It is significant that the note 
rri.ade no mention of the Employinent Agreement or that 
the proceeds should be paid in stock. (P-1). The note 
was made after the termination of the Employment 
Agreement and is unequivocal with respect to the mode 
of payment. 
(7) The Plaintiff and Defendant conversed about 
the repayment of note at a time subsequent to its exe-
cution. This conversation took place outside of the 
State Purchasing Office of the State Capitol. On that 
occasion the Defendant evidenced some concern about the 
Plaintiff trying to "peddle the note" and thereupon 
indicated that he would pay off the note. (R-21, 22). 
No mention was 1nade, however, about paying the note 
off in stock. 
( 8) While it is true, as Defendant asserts, that the 
initial investment was made in contemplation of sub-
sequently receiving stock in the Lorraine Press after it 
it was incorporated, it was also true that these matters 
never did materialize during the course of Plaintiff's 
employment. It is also true that a note was prepared 
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for Defendant's signature. (R-10, 29, 39). This note 
was never signed The note that eventually was executed 
was executPd after the agreement was terminated and 
was not tlw note contemplated in the agreement. It was 
not for the same amount and made no reference to the 
<'{)ntract or agreement and made no reference to the 
fact that the payment should be made in stock. 
From the foregoing evidence the court could have 
justifiably held that the employment agreement was 
terminated in a number of ways. Written contracts may 
be rescinded by oral agreements. 12 Am. Jur., Contracts 
§ 432; Restatement, Contracts. Vol 2 § 407. They may 
also be rescinded or terminated by implication as a 
result of the acts of the parties. An example of such 
is where the contracting parties subsequently make a 
new contract inconsistent with the term sof the former 
agreement, as Plaintiff and Defendant did in the present 
case. 1:2 Am. J ur., Contracts, §433; Restatement, Con-
tracts, Vol. 2, §508; Copper King Mining Co. v. Han-
son, 52 Utah, 605, 176 P. 623. On January 2, 1960, 
~ome three months after the execution of the employment 
agreement, the Defendant executed the note in question. 
And as has been repeatedly stated this note made no 
mention of the employment agreement or that the pre-
CPeds should be paid in stock. Therefore, such note was 
inconsistPnt with the terms of the former agreement. 
The lower court could also have based its decision 
on the fact that the contract was rescinded or termin-
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ated ·qecause of a n1aterial breach by the Defendant. It 
12 Am. J ur., Contracts, § 440; Restatement, Contracts, 
is well settled that a 1naterial breach warrants rescission. 
Yol. 2, § 397;. }.lcBride v. Stewart, 68 Utah 12; 249 Pac. 
114. Certainly the Defendant's apparent refusal to sign 
the initial promissory note prepared or his refusal 
to pay the Plaintiff a wage would constitute material 
breaches. 
POINT II. 
THE .LOWER COURT DID NOT GO BEYOND THE 
SGOPE OF THE PRE-TRIAL ORDER IN DETER-
MINING THAT THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
WAS MUTUALLY TERMINATED AND THAT THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE WAS NOT QUALIFIED BY 
THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. 
The Pre-Trial Order states as follows: "The only 
question for the trial court to determine will be whether 
or not the note in question is any part of the contract 
attached to the answer." The inquiry and testimony 
during the trial related to whether or not the note in 
question was a part of the en1ployment agreement. Much 
of the testimony dealt with whether the Plaintiff aml 
Defendant terminated their employ1nent relationship. 
This testimony was certainly material to the basic 
question involved, for if the employment relationship 
was terminated as the court found then the promissory 
note which was subsequently executed was not part of the 
contract as Defendant contends. 
The lower court did not alter the ter1ns of the 
employment agreement by requiring that re-payment 
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of Plaintiff's investment be made in "money" instead of 
··sto('k" as Defendant alleges. The court held, and 
justifiably so, that the employtnent contract was termin-
ated at the time the note was executed. Therefore, it 
had no relationship with the agreement. As such the 
note existed as a separate obligation according to the 
tt•rms thPrPin which provided for the payment in ·money. 
The Defendant's point that the trial court went 
beyond the scope of the pre-trial order is not well taken. 
All of the evidentiary tnatters considered were necessary 
and incidental to the basic question established by the 
pre-trial order. Even assuming that the court exceeded 
the scope of the. pre-trial order. Defendant's position 
is without merit. The doctrine of "Waiver" and "In-
vited Error" have application here. It is significant 
that with the exception a few basic inquiries submitted 
to Plaintiff by his counsel on direct examination, (R-2, 3) 
all of the testimony elicited was from defendant's wit-
nesses. The Defendant even made the Plaintiff his 
witness. The testimony upon which the trial court based 
its decision was elicited from Defendant's witnesses. It 
is noteworthy that with one exception the Defendant 
did not object to the admission of the testimony of the 
various witnesses nor did he object that the scope of 
Plaintiff's cross examination exceeded the scope of 
Defendant's direct examination. That one exception 
was with respect to the admission of the original un-
signed note into evidence. 
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It is well settled that a party may not complain to the 
appeal court about the improper admission of evidence 
which he himself has introduced of elicited. 5 Am. Jur., 
Appeal and Error, § 562, 717. Lowman v. Kuecker, 246 
Iowa 1227, 71 NW2d 586, 52 ALR 2d 1380. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff respectfully contends that the trial court 
did not err in holding that the pron1issory note in ques-
tion was a separate and distinct obligation from the 
employment agreernent. Even though the note related 
to the initial $1,200.00 investment by Plaintiff it was 
executed after Plaintiff and Defendant mutually term-
inated their relationship. The note made no mention 
of the ernployment agreement or that it was to be paid 
in stock. The court did not go beyond the scope of the 
pre-trial order; the evidence from which the court based 
its findings was supplied by Defendant's witnesses and 
\'.'::t,J subrnited without objection frorn Defendant that 
the testimony was beyond the scope of the pre-trial order. 
The pre-trial order limited the issues to an inquiry as 
to whether or not the note in question was related to 
thP e1nployment agreement. Implicit within such inquiry 
was the determination whether or not the employment 
agreement was operative at the time the note was exe-
cuted. The court held that it was not, and rightly so. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LAYNE B. FORBES 
Attorney for Plaintiff & Respondent 
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